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INTRODUCTION

Exculpatory clauses and indemnification clauses are used in
many contracts to allocate risk between the contracting parties.
Exculpatory clauses are a contractual waiver of the right to sue,
1
executed before the loss occurs.
Indemnity clauses serve a
different purpose: shifting a future loss to one of the contracting
2
parties, regardless of fault. Because both clauses alter the general
tort concepts of negligence and comparative fault that would
otherwise apply, they are generally disfavored and strictly construed
3
against the benefited party. Such clauses can also be void if they
4
violate public policy considerations.
In Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that exculpatory and indemnification clauses in a
houseboat rental contract were unenforceable on public policy
5
grounds. The court found that the rental of houseboats was a
public or essential service because Voyagaire is a publicly-regulated
resort and functions as an innkeeper through the rental of
houseboats. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, a houseboat
rental company cannot circumvent its innkeeper duty to protect its
guests by requiring guests to waive their right to sue the rental
company for negligence, nor can the rental company shift liability
6
for its own negligence onto guests it has a duty to protect.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Exculpatory Clauses
An exculpatory clause contractually waives one party’s right to
7
sue before that party knows whether a loss will occur. Exculpatory
clauses or liability releases are generally disfavored because they are
contrary to the general rule that a party can commence an action

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Id. at 784.
3. Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982).
4. Id.; see also Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143-44, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64
(1973) (holding that an indemnity agreement absolving seller of contact cement
of liability is void because it violates the public policy that minors should not be
sold such adhesives).
5. 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 2005).
6. Id. at 792–93.
7. BLACK’S, supra note 1, at 608.
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against another negligent party and bring that action to fruition.
Despite the fact such releases are disfavored, Minnesota appellate
courts have historically upheld these releases in the business and
commercial context, such as commercial leases and construction
9
contracts. These cases rely on principles of freedom of contract,
i.e., that parties may protect themselves against liability resulting
from their own negligence so long as the agreement does not
10
contravene public policy or public welfare.
Enforcing such
agreements allows the parties to contractually bargain for and
11
against assumption of risk.
Stated another way, exculpatory
clauses distribute the risks inherent in the performance of such
contracts so as to eliminate foreseeable disputes and reduce the
cost of the underlying transaction.
More recently, Minnesota courts have upheld exculpatory
12
clauses in cases involving recreational activities.
The general
framework for evaluating exculpatory clauses was developed in
13
Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc. In Schlobohm, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that an injured patron of a health club, by signing a

8. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 92, at 656 (5th ed. 1984).
9. See, e.g., Solidification, Inc. v. Minter, 305 N.W.2d 871, 873 (Minn. 1981);
Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 100, 189 N.W.2d
404, 407 (1971); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 266
Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (1963); Speltz Grain & Coal Co. v. Rush,
236 Minn. 1, 7, 51 N.W.2d 641, 644 (1952); Pettit Grain & Potato Co. v. N. Pac. Ry.
Co., 227 Minn. 225, 230-31, 35 N.W.2d 127, 130 (1948).
10. “[P]ublic policy ‘requires that freedom of contract shall remain inviolate,
except only in cases which contravene public right or the public welfare.’”
Arrowhead Elec. Co-Op. Inc. v. LTV Steel Mining Co., 568 N.W.2d 875, 878
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Buck v. Walker, 115 Minn. 239, 244, 132 N.W.
205, 207 (1911)).
11. See e.g., Bunia v. Knight Ridder, 544 N.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. a (1965) (“The risk of
harm from the defendant’s conduct may be assumed by express agreement
between the parties.”)).
12. See, e.g., Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn. 1982)
(injury at health club); Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) (horseback riding); Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc.,
392 N.W.2d 727, 731-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (skydiving); Dailey v. Sports World
S., Inc., No. A03-127, 2003 WL 22234699, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003),
aff’d 683 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2004) (mem.) (scuba-diving class); Ball v. Waldoch
Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL 22039946, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2,
2003) (snowmobile racing); Kaltenbach v. Splatball, Inc., No. C7-99-235, 1999 WL
690191, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1999) (paintball game); Saude v. Red River
Racquet Club, Ltd., No. C2-89-500, 1989 WL 103262, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
12, 1989) (aerobic dance class).
13. 326 N.W.2d at 920.
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membership contract with an exculpatory clause, had validly waived
14
In determining whether the
her right to sue the health club.
clause was valid, the court analyzed the relationship between the
parties, the nature of the bargaining transaction, and the type of
15
loss for which liability is disclaimed. The court held a liability
release is unenforceable if it is either (1) ambiguous in scope or
purports to release a party from liability for intentional, willful, or
16
17
wanton acts; or (2) violates public policy.
1.

Ambiguity in Scope or Release of Intentional Conduct

An exculpatory clause is ambiguous in scope when it is
18
In
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
examining ambiguity, courts follow traditional contract
19
interpretation principles by analyzing the contract as a whole. In
other words, when the injury is caused by an accident involving an
integral aspect of an activity governed by the release, the injury is
20
presumptively within the scope of a release.
Likewise, an exculpatory clause cannot release a party from
21
intentional or willful misconduct.
The Schlobohm decision was
unclear as to whether an attempt to exculpate intentional
misconduct results in the voiding of the entire clause or voiding
only the portion of the clause attempting to exculpate intentional
22
misconduct. Since Schlobohm, the decisions of the court of appeals
14. Id. at 926.
15. Id. at 923-26.
16. Willful or wanton conduct “is the failure to exercise ordinary care after
discovering a person or property in a position of peril.” Beehner, 636 N.W.2d at
829 (citing Bryant v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 221 Minn. 577, 585, 23 N.W.2d 174, 179
(1946)).
17. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926.
18. Id.; see also Collins Truck Lines, Inc. v. Metro. Waste Control Comm’n,
274 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1979) (upholding an exculpatory clause because it
has only a single reasonable interpretation).
19. Beehner, 636 N.W.2d at 827.
20. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 731
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
21. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 923.
22. Id. Schlobohm stated that an exculpatory clause is unenforceable if the
clause purports to release intentional conduct, suggesting that perhaps the mere
attempt to release such conduct renders the entire clause unenforceable.
However, the cases cited in Schlobohm from other jurisdictions suggest that an
overbroad clause that included a release of intentional conduct would merely be
narrowed to negligence claims only. Id. (citing Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376
(Colo. 1981); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1972)).
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23

have taken divergent approaches to this issue.
2.

Public Policy Considerations

Even if the exculpatory clause is free from ambiguity, the
courts will not enforce the clause if it violates public policy. A
release violates public policy if there is either (a) a disparity of
bargaining power between the parties to the agreement, or (b) the
type of service being offered by the benefited party is either a
24
public or an essential service.
a.

Disparity in Bargaining Power

A disparity of bargaining power exists if an adhesion contract
is drafted by a business and forced on an unwilling or unknowing
25
public “for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere.”
An adhesion contract is generally a contract that is for a necessary
26
service and presented on a “take it or leave it” basis. A party must
show there was a disparity in bargaining power, or “that there was
no opportunity for negotiation and that the services could not be
27
obtained elsewhere.” The fact that a party had no opportunity to
negotiate the terms of an exculpatory agreement by itself is not
28
enough to show a disparity in bargaining power.
Courts also

23. Compare Nimis v. St. Paul Turners, 521 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (concluding the release of all claims caused by negligence “or otherwise”
was an attempt to release intentional misconduct and voided the entire
exculpatory clause), with Ball v. Waldoch Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL
22039946, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003) (concluding any attempt to release
intentional misconduct would result in voiding only the portion of the exculpatory
clause which attempted to exculpate intentional misconduct). The Ball court
relied upon a federal district court decision from Kansas and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 195(1). See Wolfgang v. Mid-American Motorsports,
Inc., 898 F. Supp. 783, 787-88 (D. Kan. 1995).
24. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 923; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 195(2) (1981) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for
harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if . . . (b)
the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to
whom that duty is owed.”).
25. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 924.
26. Id.; see also Walton v. Fujita Tourist Enters. Co., 380 N.W.2d 198, 201
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding exculpatory clause unenforceable where travel
agent was presented with a contract containing an exculpatory clause on a “take it
or leave it” basis).
27. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 924-25.
28. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 730
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 14
04VRAA.DOC

5/31/2006 1:07:44 PM

1320

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

examine whether the party signing the release was a voluntary
29
participant in the activity.
b.

Type of Service Offered—Public or Essential in Nature

A public or essential service includes a service “generally
30
Services considered
thought suitable for public regulation.”
suitable for public regulation have included “common carriers,
hospitals and doctors, public utilities, innkeepers, public
warehousemen, [and] employers and services involving extra31
hazardous activities.” These types of service providers generally
have a duty to take reasonable care to protect members of the
32
public against foreseeable risk of danger.
A public or essential service may also include “services of great
importance to the public, which were a practical necessity for some
33
members of the public.”
The Schlobohm court did not list
representative services that are of “practical necessity” to the public,
but presumably this list would include activities similar to those
which are generally regulated by statute and required by most
members of the public, including hospital services, food and water
services, utility companies, common carriers, and the provision of
34
shelter.
The Schlobohm court did not comment on whether the service
at issue must be both suitable for public regulation and of practical
necessity to the public. Under either test, however, recreational
activities generally “do not fall within any of the categories where
35
Recreational activities include
the public interest is involved.”
36
37
38
39
snowmobiling, skiing, horseback riding, scuba-diving, and
29. See, e.g., Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925; Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636
N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730.
30. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925.
31. Id. (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 380, 95 N.W.2d 657,
663 (1959).
33. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926.
34. Compare Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d. at 925-26 (noting that “[i]n Minnesota
there is no statute regulating health clubs, gymnasiums or spas” while determining
that an exculpatory clause was enforceable because the activity in question was not
a public service), with Malecha, 392 N.W.2d at 730-31 (holding that an exculpatory
clause was enforceable because skydiving was not a public or essential service
despite the presence of federal regulations of “parachute jumping”).
35. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925-26.
36. Anderson v. Eby, 998 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1993); Ball v. Waldoch
Sports, Inc., No. C0-03-227, 2003 WL 22039946, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2,
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40

skydiving. Minnesota appellate courts have generally held there is
no special relationship between parties involved in such activities
because these activities involve personal enjoyment not affecting
41
the public interest.
B. Indemnification Clauses
Indemnity is a remedy that secures the right of one person to
recover reimbursement from another upon the happening of an
42
Indemnity essentially shifts the loss from one party to
event.
another, either because the parties have agreed in advance on who
should bear the loss or because principles of fairness compel the
43
shifting. The right of indemnity can be contractual or it can arise
44
under common law or statute.
Contractual indemnity has been used in a variety of
commercial transactions as a method of allocating who should bear
a particular loss that may occur in connection with the underlying

2003).
37. See Potter v. Nat’l Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (D. Colo.
1994) (finding that there is no public duty which would prevent enforcement of
an exculpatory clause required by a ski race organizer because skiing is “neither a
matter of great public importance nor a matter of practical necessity”); Chauvlier
v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d 383, 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that “skiing is a private and nonessential activity”); see also Finkler v. Toledo Ski
Club, 577 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the defendant ski
club was not liable for plaintiff’s death from an accident on a canoe trip because
plaintiff had knowingly signed a liability waiver).
38. Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 827-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
39. Dailey ex rel. Tabriz v. Sports World S., Inc., No. A03-127, 2003 WL
22234699, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003), aff’d 683 N.W.2d 302 (Minn.
2004) (mem.).
40. Malecha v. St. Croix Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 730
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
41. See Clanton v. United Skates of Am., 686 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (involving injuries at a roller-skating rink and suggesting that to hold the
release unenforceable would increase the cost of these activities and limit the
public’s opportunity to participate in them).
42. Hendrickson v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 370, 104
N.W.2d 843, 846 (1960), overruled in part by Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255
N.W.2d 362, 368 n.11 (Minn. 1977).
43. Hendrickson, 258 Minn. at 371-72, 104 N.W.2d at 847; Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d
at 366.
44. Tolbert, 255 N.W.2d at 366; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.970, subd. 1 (2004)
(employer shall indemnify its employees under certain circumstances); MINN.
STAT. § 323A.0401(c) (partnership shall indemnify its partners for certain losses or
against certain liabilities); MINN. STAT. § 466.07, subd. 1 (municipality shall
indemnify its employees and officers under certain circumstances).
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commercial transaction at issue. Indemnity clauses are commonly
used in commercial transactions, including commercial
45
46
easements,
construction contracts,
product distribution
47
agreements, agency agreements, franchise agreements, and
48
licensing agreements.
Minnesota recognizes two types of contractual indemnity
clauses: (1) indemnity against a loss, where one party agrees to
reimburse another in the event of a particular loss not within the
control of either contracting party; and (2) indemnity against
liability, where one contracting party agrees to protect the other
contracting party in the event that a third person sues the
49
protected contracting party. In the latter situation, the indemnity
clause will often provide that one of the contracting parties (the
“indemnitor”) will indemnify the other contracting party (the
“indemnitee”) against claims brought by the third party, even if the
50
claim was the result of the indemnitee’s fault or negligence.
Minnesota appellate courts have enforced such provisions in
51
commercial contexts, although the legislature has limited its use
52
in certain circumstances.
For a period of time, it was unclear whether an indemnity
clause that shifted fault from one contracting party to another was

45. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W.
226 (1939).
46. See, e.g., Nat’l Hydro Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 690 (Minn.
1995); Van Vickle v. C.W. Scheurer & Sons, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
47. See, e.g., Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973);
Osgood v. Med., Inc., 415 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
48. See, e.g., Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 N.W.2d 81
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
49. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bros, 226 Minn. 466, 469, 33 N.W.2d 46, 48
(1948) (“Contracts of indemnity may provide for indemnity against loss or damage
or for indemnity against liability.”).
50. Johnson v. McGough Constr. Co., 294 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Minn. 1980),
superseded in part by statute, MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (2004). Some contractual
indemnity clauses merely restate the principles of common law that each party is
responsible for their own fault. See, e.g., Ford v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R., 294 N.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Minn. 1980) (stating that as long as a party “is not
‘actively’ or ‘primarily’ negligent, the courts have allowed recovery under the
[indemnity] clause”).
51. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 206 Minn. 193, 195-98, 288 N.W.
226, 227-28 (1939); DeVries v. City of Austin, 261 Minn. 52, 110 N.W.2d 529
(1961).
52. See MINN. STAT. § 337.02, .05 (limiting the enforcement of certain
indemnity clauses in building and construction contracts).
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subject to greater scrutiny than other contractual provisions.
About twenty-five years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court
pronounced that indemnity clauses that shifted fault are indeed
subject to greater scrutiny, that is, such clauses are subject to “strict
54
construction.” Indeed, such a clause must contain an “express
provision” that one party has agreed to indemnify another party for
the first party’s own negligence, and “such an obligation will not be
55
found by implication.” Some indemnity clauses have been struck
down because the strict construction test was adopted, while others
56
have been upheld.
Even if an indemnity clause passes the strict construction test,
57
it must also be consistent with public policy.
In certain
53. Compare N. Pac. Ry. Co., 206 Minn. at 196, 288 N.W.2d at 227 (“If a
contract transgresses the law or contravenes public policy, it is void. If it does
neither, the parties are within their rights and the contract should have not an
arbitrary, that is, an unduly liberal or harshly strict, construction, but a fair
construction that will accomplish its stated purpose.”), with Christy v. Menasha
Corp., 297 Minn. 334, 337, 211 N.W.2d 773, 775 (1973) (reading indemnity clause
as sufficiently broad to indemnify party for injuries resulting from negligent acts).
54. Nat’l Hydro Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson, 529 N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. 1995)
(citing Farmington Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Fischer Sand & Aggregate, Inc.,
281 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 1979), superseded by MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (1994), as
recognized in Katzner v. Kelleher Constr., 545 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1996)).
55. See id.
56. Compare Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding indemnity agreement in standard architectural contract
was “equivocal at best”), and Fire Ins. Exch. v. Adamson Motors, 514 N.W.2d 807,
809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (finding agreement to indemnify lessor “from and
against any and all losses” was ambiguous and did not explicitly indemnify lessor
for its own negligence), with Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563
N.W.2d 81, 84-87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that an indemnity clause to
indemnify against all claims which may be brought against licensor “including
negligence on the part of [licensor]” was not ambiguous and thus, does not
require strict construction against the party).
57. Minnesota appellate courts have not precisely defined the public policy
considerations for enforcement of contracts. Some contracts are expressly
prohibited by statute. See MINN. STAT. §§ 337.02, .05 (2004) (indemnity
agreements in construction contracts are void except in limited circumstances); see
also MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subd. 1(a)(1) (securing employee’s rights to be free
from discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act). In other cases, the
contract is not prohibited by statute but still struck down on public policy grounds.
Generally, public policy is “evidenced by the trend of legislation, judicial decisions,
or the principles of the common law. It embraces all acts or contracts which ‘tend
clearly to injure the public health, the public morals, confidence in the purity of
the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual
rights, whether of personal liberty or private property, which every citizen has the
right to feel.’” Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362, 365, 122 N.W. 1, 2 (1909)
(quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa. 514 (1893)). By the same token, the power
of a court to declare a contract void on public policy grounds is “delicate and
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circumstances, Minnesota appellate courts have refused to enforce
an indemnity agreement when enforcement would be contrary to
58
public policy objectives. In Zerby v. Warren, a retailer violated a
statute that forbade the sale of glue containing toluene to a minor,
59
resulting in the death of the minor after he “sniffed” the glue.
The retailer attempted to enforce an indemnity agreement against
60
the glue manufacturer. The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to
enforce the indemnity agreement, finding the statute created an
absolute duty on the retailer and this fault could not be shifted
61
through an indemnity agreement to another party. Likewise, the
court of appeals has also refused to enforce fault-shifting indemnity
clauses under other circumstances, based on public policy
62
grounds.
Until the Yang decision, no Minnesota appellate court had
addressed the use of fault-shifting indemnity agreements in the
context of a consumer transaction.
III. YANG V. VOYAGAIRE HOUSEBOATS, INC.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2002, Lao Xiong contacted Voyagaire Houseboats to reserve
a houseboat for a summer vacation with his girlfriend and her
63
Voyagaire is located on the shores of Crane
extended family.
64
Voyagaire has “the largest
Lake in northern Minnesota.
houseboat rental operation in the Midwest,” and offers its “floating

undefined” and should be exercised only when the case is free from doubt. Hart
v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 76, 23 N.W.2d 375, 379 (1946).
58. See, e.g., Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 143-44, 210 N.W.2d 58, 64
(1973).
59. Id. at 144, 210 N.W.2d at 64.
60. Id. at 143, 210 N.W.2d at 64.
61. Id. at 144, 210 N.W.2d at 64.
62. Lake Cable Partners v. Interstate Power Co., 563 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (upholding indemnity clause in commercial context but holding, for
“public policy reasons,” that such indemnity obligation does not extend to shifting
liability for punitive damages); D.W. Hutt Consultants, Inc. v. Constr. Maint. Sys.,
Inc., 526 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to enforce indemnity
agreement where general contractor did not purchase required worker’s
compensation coverage and attempted to shift its financial responsibility to its
employee to another subcontractor).
63. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (2005).
64. Id.
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65

homes” for daily and weekly rental. Xiong reserved a houseboat
for a week and, as required by Voyagaire’s policy, paid a “couple
66
thousand” dollars in advance for the houseboat. The houseboat
Xiong rented included “five double beds; a penthouse bedroom;
toilet and shower facilities; a kitchen area, including a refrigerator,
stove, microwave, and sink; air conditioning; [and] a built-in
67
generator.”
On June 8, 2002, the vacationing party, consisting of six adults
and four children, made the four-hour trip as a group from
68
Minneapolis to Crane Lake. Upon arrival, Xiong met with the
owner of Voyagaire, who presented Xiong with a houseboat rental
69
agreement containing exculpatory and indemnification clauses.
This was the first time anyone from Voyagaire had ever mentioned
the rental agreement, and after looking at the agreement, Xiong
70
told the owner he did not understand it.
The agreement
contained exculpatory and indemnification clauses which provided
in relevant part:
In consideration for being permitted the use of
Voyagaire Houseboats equipment, the Renter, Lao Xiong,
his/her family, relatives, heirs and legal representatives do
hereby waive, discharge and covenant not to sue
Voyagaire Houseboats * * *, any affiliated companies, or
any of its officers or members for any loss or damage, or
any claim or damage or any injury to any person or
persons or property, or any death of any person or
persons whether caused by negligence or defect, while
such rental equipment is in my possession and/or under
my use as in accordance to the terms stated in this
agreement.
I agree to keep said equipment safe and return it to
Voyagaire Houseboats station from which it was rented
and in as good condition as when received, and in default
thereof, I agree to pay all loss and damage they may
sustain by reason of any such failure and I further agree at
my cost and expense, to defend and save Voyagaire
Houseboat[s] harmless on account of any and all suits or

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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demands brought or asserted by reason of injuries to any
person, persons or property whatsoever caused by the use
or operation of said equipment while in my possession
and to pay all judgments, liens or other encumbrances
that may be levied against Voyagaire Houseboats or the
said equipment on account of the use thereof. It is
further understood and agreed upon that the
undersigned will be liable for all fines, penalties, citations,
warnings, and forfeitures imposed for violations of the law
while the equipment is being held used or operated
pursuant to this agreement. Renter agrees that the
Owner maintains no control over Renter’s use of vessel
except as set forth in this Agreement. Therefore, Renter
shall indemnify and hold harmless Owner from and
against all claims, actions, proceedings, damage and
liabilities, arising from or connected with Renter’s
possession, use and return of the boat, or arising at any
71
time during the term of this rental.
Voyagaire’s owner told Xiong that
he did not understand the rental agreement either, but
assured Xiong that an optional $25 per day insurance fee
“would cover everything that could happen to the boat.”
Xiong “took his word,” accepted the insurance, and
signed the rental agreement. If Xiong had not signed the
agreement, Voyagaire would not have allowed him to rent
72
the houseboat.
During “the evening of June 13 or the early morning of June
14, several members of the vacationing party began feeling drowsy
73
and nauseated.”
Someone on the boat radioed for help, and
Xiong and five other persons were taken to the hospital and
74
treated for carbon-monoxide poisoning.
Xiong and the other members of the vacationing party sued
75
They claimed that Voyagaire was
Voyagaire for their injuries.
negligent in maintaining the houseboat in a safe and habitable

71. Id. at 786-87.
72. Id. at 787.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 787-88. Don Russo of Law Offices of Don Russo, P.A., in Miami,
Florida, and Elizabeth Russo of the Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., in Miami, Florida,
both represented Lao Xiong as the plaintiff in the suit that he brought against
Voyagaire. In Yang, Lao Xiong was a third-party defendant represented by the
authors.
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condition; failing to properly inspect the houseboat; failing to
comply with regulations regarding proper ventilation, safety
equipment, and devices; and failing to warn of dangerous
conditions aboard the houseboat, including exposure to carbon
76
monoxide. Voyagaire in turn:
[D]enied that it was negligent and alleged that Xiong’s
claims were barred by the exculpatory clause in the rental
agreement . . . [and] brought a third-party action against
Xiong, alleging that he had agreed to indemnify
Voyagaire from any claim or lawsuit [including
Voyagaire’s negligence] arising from his use and
77
operation of the houseboat.
78
Voyagaire and Xiong moved for summary judgment.
Voyagaire sought to enforce the exculpatory and indemnification
79
clauses and Xiong argued the clauses were unenforceable. The
district court granted Voyagaire’s motion, dismissed Xiong’s claims
based on the exculpatory clause, and held Xiong was required to
indemnify Voyagaire for its own negligence resulting in injuries to
80
the other members of the vacationing party.
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Decision
1.

The Exculpatory Clause

The court of appeals applied the enforceability test the
Minnesota Supreme Court laid out in Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc. to
81
Voyagaire’s exculpatory clause. The court of appeals concluded
the exculpatory clause was enforceable because “(1) Voyagaire does
not provide a necessary or public service; (2) renting a houseboat is
a recreational activity; (3) there was no disparity in bargaining
82
power; and (4) the contract is not ambiguous.” With respect to
the necessary public service prong, the court rejected the argument
that by renting houseboats for multiple days, Voyagaire was

76. Id. at 788.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., Nos. A03-1842, A03-2000, 2004 WL
2049843, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004) (citing Schlobohm v. Spa Petite,
Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920 (1982)).
82. Id. at *4.
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furnishing sleeping accommodations to the public, analogous to
83
the services provided by an innkeeper. The court also concluded
that houseboats do not fall within the definition of “resort” in the
statutes, so they are not subject to public regulation as an
84
innkeeper.
2.

The Indemnification Clause

The court of appeals also enforced the indemnity clause,
concluding “the indemnification clause is sufficiently clear,
85
sufficiently broad, and is not void on public policy grounds.” The
court of appeals held the language in the indemnification clause
was sufficiently broad to include claims for Voyagaire’s own
86
negligence.
Furthermore, because the indemnification clause
included indemnification for any claims “arising at any time during
the rental,” the plain language “show[ed] Voyagaire’s intent to seek
indemnification for any claim arising during the rental period,”
regardless of whether the cause of the claim occurred before the
87
renter actually took possession of the houseboat. The court also
concluded that the decisions outlining the strict construction test
for fault-shifting indemnity agreements applied only to building
88
and construction contracts.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and held both the
exculpatory clause and indemnification clauses were unenforceable
89
on public policy grounds. The court concluded that Voyagaire is
an innkeeper providing a public service of offering sleeping
90
accommodations. An innkeeper “cannot circumvent its duty to
protect its guests by requiring a guest to sign a rental agreement
containing an exculpatory clause,” nor can it shift liability through
an indemnity clause for their own negligence onto guests whom
91
the innkeeper has a duty to protect.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *2-3.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5-6.
Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 791-92.
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The Exculpatory Clause

In examining the exculpatory clause, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reiterated the concept that exculpatory clauses are “‘not
favored,’ and they are ‘strictly construed against the benefited
92
party.’” The court focused on the public policy consideration of
93
whether the rental contract was for a public or essential service.
The Schlobohm decision had specifically listed “innkeepers” as
offering the type of services thought suitable for public regulation
and thus considered innkeepers as offering an essential service for
94
which a party cannot seek exculpation. The court examined the
statutory definition of “resort,” and concluded that the rental of
houseboats for daily or weekly rental constitutes “resort” functions
95
within the statutory framework.
As a resort offering sleeping
accommodations to the public in its lodge rooms as well as its
houseboats, Voyagaire met the statutory definition of an
96
“innkeeper.”
Following up on the reasoning of Schlobohm, the
court concluded that an innkeeper provides a public service and
97
has a duty to take reasonable action to protect its guests. The
court stated, “as a matter of public policy, Voyagaire cannot
circumvent its duty to protect its guests by requiring the guests to
sign a rental agreement containing an exculpatory clause that
purports to release Voyagaire from liability for the resort’s
98
negligence.”
Thus, the exculpatory clause was struck down on
99
public policy grounds.

92. Id. at 789 (citing Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923
(Minn. 1982)).
93. Id. at 789-91.
94. Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (citing LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Bd., 360
N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)); see also Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d
821, 824 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (“It is also against public policy to permit
exculpatory agreements as to transactions involving the public interest, as for
example with regard to . . . innkeepers.”).
95. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790 (construing MINN. STAT. § 157.15, subd. 11
(2004)).
96. Id. (construing MINN. STAT. § 327.70, subds. 3-4 (2004)).
97. Id. (citing Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 380, 95 N.W.2d 657,
663 (1959)).
98. Id. at 791.
99. Id. In a footnote, the court also noted that the circumstances under
which the exculpatory clause was signed “suggest that there was some disparity in
bargaining power between Voyagaire and Xiong,” when the evidence is viewed in
the light most favorable to Xiong. Id. at 789 n.3. However, the court did not rest
its decision on this second prong of the public policy considerations. Id.
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The Indemnification Clause

With respect to the indemnification clause, the court began
with the general concept that indemnity clauses which seek
indemnification for one’s own negligence are not favored and will
not be enforced unless that intention is expressed in “clear and
100
unequivocal terms.”
After noting that it had previously struck
down indemnity clauses on public policy grounds, the court
concluded that, “[a]s a matter of public policy, innkeepers cannot
shift liability for their own negligence onto the guests they have a
101
duty to protect.”
The court also noted, in a “broader context,” the unfairness of
holding a private individual liable for a business’s negligence that
resulted in serious injury, where the private individual was not
102
warned of the specific risks involved.
In addition, there was no
precedent in Minnesota or elsewhere upholding a fault-shifting
indemnification clause under similar circumstances, and the court
cited a Wyoming federal district court case for the proposition that
the modern trend is to not enforce indemnity clauses of this type
103
on public policy grounds.
While it focused on the public policy aspects of its decision,
the court also concluded that the indemnification clauses at issue
were not enforceable because the language was not “clear and
104
unequivocal.”
In a footnote, the court noted that the
indemnification clauses “do not contain language that (1)
specifically refers to negligence, (2) expressly states that the renter
will indemnify Voyagaire for Voyagaire’s negligence, or (3) clearly
indicates that the renter will indemnify Voyagaire for negligence
105
occurring before the renter took possession of the houseboat.”
The view advanced by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which had
concluded that the strict construction test of indemnification
clauses was limited to building and construction contracts, was

100. Id. at 791 (quoting Nat’l Hydro. Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d
690, 694 (Minn. 1995)).
101. Id. at 791-92.
102. Id. at 792.
103. Id. at 793 (citing Madsen v. Wyo. River Trips, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1321,
1325 (D. Wyo. 1999) (declining to enforce fault-shifting indemnity clause in river
rafting contract, noting that the “unprecedented attempt to hold a private citizen
to an indemnity contract for a service that he himself purchased will not stand”)).
104. Id. at 792 n.5.
105. Id.
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specifically rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court here.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Exculpatory Clauses

The Yang decision represents a significant benchmark for
evaluating whether an exculpatory clause will be enforced on
public policy grounds. The dispositive factor for the high court was
the type of service—sleeping accommodations—offered to the
public, which supported labeling Voyagaire as an innkeeper. The
court, in concluding it was appropriate to treat Voyagaire as an
innkeeper, established that innkeepers have a duty to take
reasonable action to protect their guests and cannot circumvent
their duty by requiring guests to waive their right to sue for
negligence. It is the first time that the high court struck down an
exculpatory clause on public policy grounds.
On the other hand, the decision has limited reach. The
Minnesota Supreme Court stayed very close to the analytical
framework developed in the Schlobohm decision. Under Schlobohm,
the public or essential services determination requires
consideration of (1) whether the type of service is generally
thought suitable for public regulation, and (2) whether the offered
107
service is of practical necessity to the public.
In Yang, the court
carefully analyzed the applicable statutes and first concluded that
Voyagaire was subject to regulation as a “resort” under the
governing statutes, and second, that Voyagaire—by offering
sleeping accommodations to the public—was providing a public
108
service and therefore could not exculpate its fault.
In other
words, the court found that both Schlobohm considerations—public
regulation and necessary service—were present in this case and
supported the voidance of the exculpatory clause.
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not address whether both
factors must be present to void the use of an exculpatory clause for
a particular service. It is likely, however, that most services of
practical necessity to the public are already publicly regulated in
one form or another. Therefore, there may be little practical
106. Id. (citing Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., Nos. A03-1842, A03-2000,
2004 WL 2049843, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2004)).
107. Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925-26 (Minn. 1982).
108. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790-91.
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problem with applying Schlobohm and Yang to further cases.
However, there will always be close cases in which a service may fall
within one category and not the other. For example, does the
mere rental of camping equipment such as tents or sleeping bags
constitute the offering of public or essential services? Conversely,
can a publicly-regulated resort that offers sleeping accommodations
and other recreational activities use an exculpatory clause for other
functions of its resort operations, such as horseback riding or water
109
skiing?
The answers to these questions remain to be seen in
future cases.
B. Indemnity Clauses
The ruling on the indemnity clause has a broader reach. The
high court summarily concluded that an innkeeper cannot, as a
matter of public policy, shift its own causal fault onto guests that it
110
has a duty to protect. But the court went further and commented
that it is generally unfair and unprecedented to uphold an
indemnity clause that would shift the negligence of a commercial
entity onto a private individual, especially where the individual was
111
not warned about the specific risks involved.
The comments by
the court make sense: businesses understand risk, insure against
risk, and typically have attorneys that advise them about risk.
Private individuals, on the other hand, do not typically carry
insurance for indemnity obligations they may undertake in the
context of renting goods or purchasing services. The court,
however, did not hold that any indemnity clause in any consumer
contract could never be upheld, but the comments by the court
suggest that such clauses should not typically be enforced.
The decision also addresses the strict construction test
applicable to indemnity agreements that seek to shift negligence
from one party to another—and specifically held that the
indemnity clause at issue is not enforceable under the strict
112
construction test. This represents the first decision in almost ten
109. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a similar, but not identical,
issue in Beehner v. Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The
Beehner court upheld an exculpatory clause because the two distinct entities, a
resort and riding stables, were not a joint venture. 636 N.W.2d at 833. Thus, the
court left unanswered the question of whether the exculpatory clause would have
been voided had the resort owned the riding stables.
110. Yang, 701 N.W.2d at 790-91.
111. Id. at 792.
112. Id. at 791 n.5.
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years to reiterate the key requirements for ensuring that a faultshifting indemnity clause is valid and enforceable; that is, there
must be a specific reference to negligence, express assumption of
the negligence of another, and clarity on the scope of the
113
indemnity clause.
The court concluded that the language did
not “fairly apprise[]” Xiong of an obligation to indemnify
Voyagaire for the negligence of Voyagaire that occurred before the
114
rental term began.
The ruling calls into question some of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decisions that did not apply the strict
115
construction test with the rigor outlined in the Yang decision.
V. CONCLUSION
While exculpatory clauses and indemnity clauses are helpful
tools to allocate risk in appropriate circumstances, the Yang
decision further defines the limits of these clauses imposed by
public policy considerations. Exculpatory clauses will not be
enforced when the transaction involves a public or essential service.
Although some uncertainty may exist over whether the purchased
service must be both publicly regulated and of practical necessity,
the Yang decision confirms that such clauses are not appropriate
for certain services such as innkeeping and will not be enforced.
Likewise, Yang is the first decision to consider the clarity and
enforceability of a fault-shifting indemnity clause in a private
consumer transaction. Not surprisingly, the high court concluded
that fault-shifting indemnity agreements are not generally
appropriate for consumer transactions. In addition, the court
reiterated that fault-shifting indemnity clauses will be strictly
construed and must contain an express assumption of fault.

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Bogatzki v. Hoffman, 430 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(upholding an indemnity clause that made an employee injured on the
employer’s premises liable for the employee’s own negligence); Osgood v. Med.,
Inc., 415 N.W.2d 896, 902-03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding an indemnity
clause relating to a heart valve component).
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